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The Issue 
The grain handling sector in Canada and the United States is vital to agriculture and trade. 
In a typical year on the Canadian prairies, about 140,000 producers deliver some 20 to 30 
mmt of grain for export to primary elevators. In the  United States, about 2.1  million 
producers deliver about 300 mmt of grain to primary elevators. Canadian grain is moved 
to export position using more than 400,000 hopper cars and marine containers, where 
about  1,200  ships  per  year  are  loaded.  In  the  United  States,  about  1.08  million  rail 
carloads of grain are originated per year, and about 23 mmt of grain are shipped on barges 
per year. These U.S. figures are in addition to trucks, which, more so than in Canada, are 
also used to deliver grain to primary processors and to terminal and export markets.  
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The volume of grain trade gives rise to concern about risks of terrorism in the sector.
1 
From  a  security  perspective,  the  grain,  pulse  and  oilseed  supply  chain  is  noteworthy 
because  much  of  it  is  characterized  by  relatively  long-term,  insecure,  bulky  storage 
(particularly on farms) along  with numerous  modal  and inter-modal product transfers. 
These factors suggest there are many places where chemical or biological contaminants 
could be introduced into this supply chain. From the perspective of the United States, 
security throughout the Canadian system as well as the U.S. system is a concern, since 
cross-border traffic in these products is significant, with an average of about six million 
tonnes of grain products alone imported into the U.S. each year (USDA-FAS, 2003).  
Numerous interventions to enhance food safety and mitigate the risk of terrorism have 
been  adopted  or  are  in  the  process  of  being  developed.  Some  of  these  are  private 
initiatives  and  voluntary,  as  a  component  of  firm-level  security  processes.  Others  are 
being adopted in response to legislated initiatives. The stakes are large, and there are 
likely to be substantial differences in costs and effectiveness of different approaches.  
To  frame  the  analysis,  we  begin  with  a  brief  discussion  of  current  initiatives  to 
mitigate agro-terrorism risks. Next, a real-options analytical framework is developed to 
evaluate, in terms of cost effectiveness, investment strategies to mitigate agro-terrorism 
risks. Finally, simulation results are used to describe management and policy implications 
of investment in risk mitigation with respect to agro-terrorism/food safety. 
Implications and Conclusions 
As time passes, risk management related to the potential for terrorism in the grain supply 
chain will escalate in importance. While current initiatives to mitigate agro-terrorism risks 
are  important,  are  they  appropriate?  How  do  we  prioritize  investment  in  mitigation 
strategies to account for risks, costs, and benefits? To help answer these questions, we 
evaluate the overall need for investment in terror mitigation in the grain sector using a 
real-options  framework.  We  develop  a  prototypical  example,  using  best  estimates  of 
parameter  values,  which  tracks  millions  of  bushels  from  producers  to  end-users.  Our 
model and results indicate that a sector with high volatility and a high net present value 
(NPV)/cost  ratio  (such  as  the  rail  transportation  sector)  provides  valid  real-option 
opportunities for mitigating agro-terrorism risk in the grain supply chain.  
A major problem with using financial data generated by engineers on the different 
segments in the grain handling and transportation system is to account explicitly for the 
linkages between segments (from producers to end-users) and sectors. Results indicate 
that  an  agro-terrorism  attack  in  the  livestock  sector  will  have  indirect  effects  that 
necessitate  investment  in  hedging,  using  futures  or  options,  for  corn  producers. 
Investment strategies should not overlook such linkages. As well, research on real-option 
investment  strategies,  using  the  “tomato  garden”  framework  described  by  Luehrman 
(1998),  that  explicitly  accounts  for  such  linkages,  is  illustrated  in  this  article;  further Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  W. Nganje, W. W. Wilson and J. Nolan 
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research of this sort is highly encouraged. Regardless, it is important for the rail system 
and other sectors in the grain handling and transportation system to invest in tamper-proof 
seals, as suggested by the World Health Organization (WHO). 
What is Being Done about  
Agro-terrorism in the Grain Handling Sector? 
Varying forms of intervention might mitigate risks of terrorism, including high profile 
public and legislated initiatives. There are also numerous examples of private initiatives. 
These  are  noteworthy  in  the  transportation  sector;  for  instance,  some  railroads  have 
embarked  on  thoughtful  and  carefully  coordinated  initiatives.  Typically,  these  involve 
security, surveillance, sealed  cars  and periodic forms of testing.  Food companies  also 
engage in efforts to mitigate risks associated with the possibility of food terrorism, but 
these are predominantly voluntary and are difficult to monitor (U.S.-GAO, 2003). Finally, 
one of the higher profile risk mitigation efforts is the FDA’s set of regulations that apply 
to imported food, requiring permits, testing, and registration of the food plant. These will 
affect exports of Canadian grain to the United States.  
Thus far, the reaction of the Canadian government to the perceived terrorist threat has 
been  mostly  directed  toward  guaranteeing  modal  security  within  the  transportation 
industries.  However,  modal  security  related  specifically  to  trade  has  received  far  less 
attention and money from the Canadian government than from the U.S. government. The 
United States and Canada signed the so-called Smart Border Declaration (SBD) in late 
2001,  with  the  goal  of  negotiating  a  joint  industry-government  set  of  guidelines  to 
enhance the security of U.S.-bound trade. In 2002, Transport Canada formed the National 
Road Security Team (NRST) to handle pressing trucking industry security concerns, from 
infrastructure  to  border  delays  (Transport  Canada,  2003).  Under  these  agreements, 
particular security focus will be given to what are referred to as “high-risk” containers 
crossing the border (Canadian  Pacific, 2003).  More  definitive action for railways  was 
taken in April 2003, when the U.S. and Canadian customs agencies, along with the two 
Class I Canadian railways, signed an extended version of the SBD tailored to the needs of 
the railway industry (Canadian Pacific, 2003). At that time, both railways also obtained 
accreditation  with  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Customs  and  Border  Protection  (CBP)  under  a 
security program called C-TPAT (Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism). In sum, 
the private sector in Canada appears to be taking the major initiative on security measures 
for surface transportation modes.  
Not  surprisingly,  U.S.  reaction  to  freight  transportation  security  has  been  more 
pronounced.  Under  the  auspices  of  the  new  U.S.  Department  of  Homeland  Security, 
security initiatives that will affect agricultural supply chains are those aimed at enhancing 
general  port  security  along  with  other  programs  that  specifically  address  the  issue  of 
marine container security.  The  Container Security Initiative (CSI)  was begun in  early Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  W. Nganje, W. W. Wilson and J. Nolan 
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2002  (United  States,  2002)  and  is  intended  to  better  identify  and  target  “high-risk” 
containers coming from abroad. Security agreements have been reached with major ports 
around the globe, including many in Europe and Asia. Several of these ports actually have 
U.S. customs officers on site to monitor container traffic (Canadian ports are not part of 
this  program).  In  June  2003,  $170  million  in  general  funding  was  awarded  for  port 
security enhancements across the United States. These grants will fund security upgrades 
such  as  harbor  patrols,  surveillance  equipment  and  command  and  control  facilities 
(Transportation Security Administration, 2003).  
Clearly, many of the transportation-related security measures initiated by the United 
States  will  by  extension  provide  more  security  for  Canada,  while  the  converse  is  not 
necessarily the case. If we consider recommended policy responses to the possibility of 
agro-terrorism  (i.e.,  directives  from  the  WHO),  the  potential  contamination  of  the 
Canadian grain and specialty crop supply chain via the transportation system has not been 
taken  very  seriously.  While  this  understated  approach  may  be  a  reasonable  policy 
response, Canada continues to be a weak link in the growing U.S. security network. 
The other segment of the grain supply chain that appears to be susceptible to agro-
terrorism is the elevator system. With just under 400 elevators in western Canada (Nolan, 
2003) and 9,525 off-farm grain storage facilities in the United States (315 state-licensed 
grain elevators in North Dakota alone), adding protection against deliberate contamination 
for each elevator would be costly. Elevators are usually well monitored by staff, but have 
little formal security in place; thus, while it would be tricky to add contaminants without 
being noticed, it would not be impossible, for instance, to spread anthrax spores on top of 
grain waiting in an elevator for shipment.  
Given the ways in which grain is moved and blended, it is unlikely that contamination 
at the elevator level would seriously affect any particular group of consumers; however, 
public concern about food contaminants at the moment is significant. The recently settled 
StarLink case where genetically modified corn accidentally entered the human food chain 
showed  just  how  visible  any  contamination,  no  matter  how  benign,  has  become 
(Congressional Research Service, 2003). The StarLink case also showed that, so long as 
changes  or  additives  to  products  are  not  visually  observable,  there  is  a  chance  that  a 
malicious intrusion in the supply chain could propagate enough to be nominally detectable 
by, if not unsafe for, the consumer.  
Why Is the Real-options Approach an Appropriate Tool 
for Evaluating and Mitigating Risks of Agro-terrorism? 
Public and private sector investments in  agro-terrorism surveillance, preparedness and 
response create real-option opportunities along the food supply chain. Such investments 
have  heightened  following  the  September  11
th  terrorist  attack.  While  few  reliable 
estimates of the total economic cost of the terrorist attacks have been completed, on the Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  W. Nganje, W. W. Wilson and J. Nolan 
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transportation side, conservative estimates of the delay costs for the trucking industry 
alone  in  the  weeks  following  September  11
th  are  in  the  tens  of  millions  of  Canadian 
dollars (Goldfarb and Robson, 2003).  
Public sector investments in the United States include the Public Health Security and 
Preparedness Act of 2002, the aforementioned C-TPAT, the CSI and several federally 
funded  and  state-funded  research  initiatives  (Dorgan,  2003;  Trotter,  2002;  and  Koch, 
2002).  Blandford  (2002)  indicated  that  private  companies  are  taking  steps  toward 
adopting measures (such as contracting and identity preservation) to minimize exposure to 
lost  sales.  These  public  and  private  sector  investments  in  agro-terrorism  safeguards 
indicate  that  real-options  investment  opportunities  exist  to  mitigate  uncertainty  about 
future returns in the grain supply chain.  
Challenges associated with data availability and with the complexities of estimating 
costs and benefits have handicapped studies of cost-effective risk mitigation strategies. 
However, recent advancements in the area of real-options research using financial data 
from engineering techniques provide a systematic framework for evaluating cost-effective 
agro-terrorism risk mitigation strategies. In addition, complex problems can be analyzed 
using a nest of options as discussed in the “tomato garden” metaphor (Luehrman, 1998).
2 
This  framework  is  used  here  to  identify  and  prioritize  hazards  among  seven  critical 
sections along the grain supply chain system to help determine cost-effective strategies for 
mitigation of agro-terrorism threats to the U.S.-Canadian grain handling system.  
A Real-options Approach to  
Managing the Risks of Agro-terrorism  
We focus our research on key economic entities/agents in the wheat and corn marketing 
and  transportation  chain:  grower,  country  elevator,  railway,  domestic  user/processor, 
export elevator, ship and importer. Basic requirements of a system that is intended to 
prevent  agro-terrorism  would  normally  include  the  installation  of  new  equipment  or 
procedures. This sunk cost could be specific to the economic agent or firm. Market risk 
and residual agro-terrorism risk comprise the main sources of uncertainty associated with 
the returns from an investment in increased food protection. Large positive opportunity 
costs or option values could arise from these uncertainties. The firm must cover these 
costs as well as the sunk costs.  
The real-options approach to agro-terrorism investment assumes that 1) an investor 
has the opportunity to invest in a prevention strategy and 2) the investor prefers reduced 
income volatility. Although the value of the project cannot clearly be known at the time of 
the  investment,  the  effect  on  investment  behavior  of  the  uncertainty  related  to  agro-
terrorism/food safety can be valued using real options. In the mixed stochastic process 
outlined by Salin (1998), future returns to such an investment are assumed to follow a 
mixed  Brownian  motion  (continuous)  and  a  Poisson  (jump)  process.  Continuous Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  W. Nganje, W. W. Wilson and J. Nolan 
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movement of the process is due to price and production variability while the discrete jump 
can be attributed to uncertain agro-terrorism events.  
Methods  that  employ  data  from  financial  engineering  or  risk-neutral  valuation 
techniques are used to estimate real-option values for the economic  entities using the 
“tomato garden” framework (Luehrman, 1998). This model requires the estimation of two 
variables:  a  value-to-cost  matrix  (ratio  of  NPV  of  investment  in  mitigation  of  agro-
terrorism  to  the  cost  of  this  investment)  and  a  volatility  matrix  (product  of  standard 
deviation of returns and the square root of time). Figure 1 shows both variables graphed in 
a two-dimensional representation called the “option space”. The first variable contains not 
only all the data typically captured in net-present-value and real-option problems but also 
adds a time value associated with being able to defer the investment. The second variable 
measures how much the state of the world can change before an investment decision must 
be made. The option space is characterized by these two variables, with value-to-cost on 
the horizontal axis and volatility on the vertical axis.  
Traditional NPV models used in real-options formulations provide only two options: 
invest or don’t invest. Extending real-options analysis in the framework used here gives 
the  investor  an  added  advantage  of  having  NPV,  two  extra  metrics,  plus  six  possible 
actions  that  not  only  reflect  what  should  be  done  immediately  but  also  indicate  the 
likelihood that an investment will be beneficial in the future. Another advantage of the 
 
Figure 1  A stylized mapping of projects into option space 
Source: adapted from Luehrman (1998) Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  W. Nganje, W. W. Wilson and J. Nolan 
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“tomato  garden”  matrix  is  that  public  investment  strategies  for  all  economic 
entities/sectors in the grain supply chain can be represented as nested options, a series of 
options explicitly designed to affect one another (Luehrman, 1998). This strategy allows a 
sequence of contingencies, for alternative economic entities, to be added in to public or 
private sector investment decisions. For example, public investment may target sectors 
with greatest risk, evaluate how investments in these sectors mitigate agro-terrorism risk 
and then decide to invest in other sectors with the potential to further mitigate risks. In 
sum, the nested options formulation allows the aggregate investment in agro-terrorism 
mitigation to be evaluated more effectively than other formulations allow. 
Case Study of the U.S. Grain Marketing System  
To illustrate the methodology, two numerical simulations were developed with respect to 
agro-terrorism surveillance for U.S. wheat and corn production and associated handling 
and  transportation  systems.
3  The  limited  literature  on  the  topic  suggests  that  agro-
terrorism attacks might be made directly on the grain sector using chemical or biological 
weapons such as anthrax, cyanide, etc., or alternatively that the grain sector may suffer 
indirectly as a result of an attack on the livestock sector. We used wheat data to simulate 
investments to mitigate direct agro-terrorism on the grain sector. Corn data were used to 
simulate investments to mitigate indirect effects from an attack on the livestock sector, 
such  as  introduction  of  foot-and-mouth  disease.  Real  options  were  developed  for  all 
economic functions along the grain production and logistic supply chain in both examples.  
Distributions and correlations for and between yields and prices were estimated for a 
typical wheat grower utilizing U.S. averages for 1993/94 to 2002/03 (USDA-ERS, 2003). 
The average size of farm was assumed to be 294 acres planted to wheat (Ali, 2002). Costs 
of surveillance equipment and monitoring at the grower level were assumed to be $11,570 
for equipment and $18,250 for a review of tapes on each farm over a five-year period 
(Gustafson, 2003).  
At the level of handling and transportation, surveillance costs were assumed to be 10 
cents/bu for country elevators, 50 cents/bu for rail shippers, 5 cents/bu for export elevators 
and  50  cents/bu  for  ocean  shipping.  Additional  monitoring  and  surveillance  costs  for 
country and export elevators were assumed to be double those for farms, or $59,640 over 
a five-year period (Mauch, 2003). Testing costs were assumed to be 5 cents/bu at each 
location.  These  costs  were  applied  to  the  proportion  sampled  of  the  total  volume  of 
bushels  handled  at  each  location  over  the  five-year  period.  We  assumed  that  only 
10 percent of bushels handled were sampled for bio-terrorist attacks at each location (Koo 
and Matson, 2002). 
Parameters for secondary or indirect impacts were adopted from Huff, Meilke and 
Turvey (2003). Primary yield effects were assumed to decrease volume by 5 percent at all 
locations (table 1). Price effects for growers, domestic users and importers were assumed Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  W. Nganje, W. W. Wilson and J. Nolan 
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to be equivalent to secondary impacts on prices. As an approximation, country elevators, 
rail movement, export elevators and ocean shipping were all assumed to be competitive 
markets operating on pricing margins, so no price effect was included for these sectors. 
For corn growers, distributions and correlations for yields and prices were estimated 
for an average corn grower utilizing U.S. averages for 1993/94 to 2002/03 (USDA-ERS, 
Feed Situation and Outlook Yearbook, 2003). Average farm size was assumed to be 162 
acres planted to corn (USDA-NASS, 1999).  
The  optimal  NPVs  for  both  wheat  and  corn  sectors  were  simulated  using  @Risk 
Palisade Decision Tool Software. The simulation model was iterated 5,000 times for each 
element  of  the  supply  chain;  at  this  point,  the  results  were  within  optimum  stopping 
criteria.  Table  2  presents  the  base-case  results  for  both  wheat  and  corn.  A  graphical 
breakdown of our real-option simulation results (presented in figures 2 and 3) indicates 
that in the current analysis only one link/location in the grain supply chain (the rail sector) 
needs to be considered for immediate investment in strategies to mitigate agro-terrorism. 
This conclusion is based on the high volatility and high NPV/cost ratio in that sector; 
these  factors  yield  valid  real-option  opportunities  for  mitigating  risk.  The  rail 
transportation  sector  and  other  sectors  in  the  grain  handling  system  should  undertake 
investments in tamper-proof seals for shipping containers, as suggested recently by the 
WHO.  
We find that related investments in other locations along the grain supply chain can be 
postponed. While it may be beneficial to invest in agro-terrorism protection for producers 
and grain handlers, it certainly will not be beneficial to make such investments at all the 
locations examined here.  
Table 1  Parameters for Direct and Secondary Yield and Price Effects of Bio-terrorist Attacks. 
  Direct  Secondary* 
  Quantity  Price  Quantity  Price 
Grower  -5%  -.04%  -0.1%  -0.4% 
Country elevator  -5%    -0.1%   
Rail  -5%    -0.1%   
Domestic user  -5%  -0.4%  -0.1%  -0.4% 
Export elevator  -5%    -0.1%   
Ship  -5%    1.5%   
Importer  -5%  -0.4%  1.5%  -0.4% 
*Secondary impacts taken from Huff, Meilke and Turvey (2003, 29). Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  W. Nganje, W. W. Wilson and J. Nolan 
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One  problem  with  using  financial  data  generated  by  engineers  for  the  different 
segments of the grain handling and transportation system is to account explicitly for the 
linkages between segments. This study validates other results by Huff, Meilke and Turvey 
(2003),  which  indicate  that  an  agro-terrorism  attack  in  the  livestock  sector  will  have 
indirect effects that necessitate investment in hedging, using futures or options, for corn 
producers.  Investment  strategies  should  not  overlook  such  linkages.  As  well,  further 
research  on  real-option  investment  strategies,  using  the  “tomato  garden”  framework, 
which explicitly accounts for such linkages, is highly encouraged.  
Discussion 
The grain handling industry in Canada and the United States is vital to agriculture and 
trade. Though this industry is not necessarily the most likely target for food terrorism, the 
volume of trade provides some concern about the risks of terrorism. While the United 
States  has  been  more  aggressive  in  initiating  risk  mitigation  than  Canada  has,  the 
enormous trade interdependence between the two countries makes the issue important to 
Canada as well.  
Table 2  Base Case Results for Wheat and Corn 
Wheat 
  NPV  Cost  NPV/cost  Volatility 
Grower  0  102  0.00  0.82 
Country elevator  70,430  184,640  0.38  0.31 
Rail  492,753  136,364  3.61  3.30 
Domestic user  0  184,640  0.00  0.67 
Export elevator  33,040  184,640  0.18  0.30 
Ship  0  126,136  0.00  0.46 
Importer  0  184,640  0.00  0.59 
Corn 
Grower  0  187  0.00  0.77 
Country elevator  70,430  184,640  0.38  0.31 
Rail  492,753  135,714  3.63  0.30 
Domestic user  0  184,640  0.00  0.59 
Export elevator  33,040  184,640  0.18  0.30 
Ship  0  126,136  0.00  0.46 
Importer  0  184,640  0.00  0.51 
 Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  W. Nganje, W. W. Wilson and J. Nolan 
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This article has focused on terrorism in the grain handling system, which includes not 
only distribution at elevators but also trucking and rail transportation and the supply chain 
flow to food products. Ideally, resources would exist to protect all the locations along the 
supply chain against agro-terrorism risks. However, limited resources in the public and 
private sectors imply that investment should be targeted to the entities that are exposed to 
most risk and will incur the least investment expenses. The “tomato garden” real-options 
framework provides an appropriate evaluation method to help policy makers prioritize 

































































Figure 3  NPV/costs vs. volatility for corn investments at all seven locations Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  W. Nganje, W. W. Wilson and J. Nolan 
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Endnotes 
1  For  our  purposes,  food  terrorism  is  defined  as  the  “act  or  threat  of  deliberate 
contamination of food for human consumption with chemical, biological or radionuclear 
agents for the purpose of causing injury or death to civilian populations and/or disrupting 
social, economic or political stability” (World Health Organization, 2002, 3). 
2 The tomato garden metaphor illustrates the real-options approach by likening a portfolio 
of options to a garden of tomatoes in an unpredictable climate. On any given day, the 
gardener  will find some tomatoes  are ripe  and perfect for harvest  while others  are at 
different stages and either will require more time to ripen or must be discarded because 
they are rotten. The active decision maker (the gardener in this case) has the liberty to 
assess each tomato’s prospect as the season progresses, and to decide which to pick and 
which to leave on the vine.  
3 While the appropriate data could not easily be found, we expect that a similar study done 
with respect to the Canadian grain handling and transportation system (for wheat) would 
yield very similar results.  